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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUE STATEMENTS1
1.

Did the district court correctly deny Plaintiff/Appellant Aaron

Raiser's ("Mr. Raiser") motions for sanctions and award Appellee Brigham Young
University ("BYU") its attorney fees and costs for successfully defending against the
motions?
2.

Did the district court properly issue a bench warrant after Mr.

Raiser failed to appear at a supplemental proceeding for which he received personal
service?
3.

Did the district court properly deny Mr. Raiser's motion to amend

his complaint for a third time where Mr. Raiser knew of the facts underlying his proposed
amended complaint at the time that he filed his original complaint, provided no
explanation for why leave to amend should be granted, and sought to add no defensible
claim?
4.

Did the district court correctly deny Mr. Raiser's motion to disqualify

the district court judge where his only allegations of bias were that he received adverse

1

Mr. Raiser's brief enumerates eight issues. However, some of those "issues" are
either subissues or nonissues. Giving Mr. Raiser the benefit of the doubt and attempting
to identify the substantive issues articulated in Mr. Raiser's brief, BYU has identified four
issues that it believes encompass all of Mr. Raiser's arguments on appeal.
-1-

rulings in the district court?
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Rule 11(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
(b) By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court
(whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery;
and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of
information or belief.
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b) (emphasis added).
Rule 11(c)(1)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part,
as follows:
If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the
reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing
the motion [for Rule 11 sanctions].
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
Rule 64(c)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
The court may conduct hearings as necessary to identify property and to
apply the property toward the satisfaction of the judgment or order.
-2-

Witnesses may be subpoenaed to appear, testify and produce records. The
court may permit discovery.
Utah R. Civ. P. 64(c)(2) (emphasis added).
Rule 3.3(d) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct provides as follows:
In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material
facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed
decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 3.3(d).
Utah Code Annotated section 78-32-1(5) provides as follows:
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings therein
are contempts of the authority of the court:
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the
court.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1(5).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION
This action was commenced on August 26, 2002, when Mr. Raiser filed a

complaint alleging certain civil rights claims. After numerous motions to amend the
complaint and motions for sanctions against BYU filed by Mr. Raiser, the case terminated
with BYU obtaining (1) a judgment against Mr. Raiser in the amount of $4,748.15, with
interest accruing at 6.36% per annum, to reflect the attorney fees BYU incurred in
defending itself against Mr. Raiser's Rule 11 motions; and (2) judgment on the pleadings
and a dismissal of Mr. Raiser's case. Mr. Raiser appeals.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case commenced with a volley of complaints, motions to amend complaints,

and amended complaints filed by Mr. Raiser. On August 26, 2002, Mr. Raiser filed a
complaint against B YU in the Fourth Judicial District Court alleging civil rights
violations, false imprisonment, and defamation. R. at 2-3. The next day, on August 27,
2002, Mr. Raiser filed an amended complaint raising the same three causes of action. R.
at 14-15. On September 7, 2002, Mr. Raiser filed a motion to amend his complaint yet
again, seeking to delete his claims based upon federal civil rights violations and to add
claims for false light and "publicity of private life." R. at 30. On September 18, 2002,
the district court granted Mr. Raiser's motion to amend. R. at 31. Mr. Raiser's second
amended complaint presented false light, false imprisonment, defamation, and "publicity
of private life" claims. R. at 32-36.
BYU interrupted Mr. Raiser's stream of complaints and amendments on
September 20, 2002, when it attempted to remove this and other actions filed by Mr.
Raiser in Fourth District Court to federal court and to consolidate them. See R. at 52, 54.
As a basis for removal, BYU relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and on 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). R.
at 50. When the federal court granted Mr. Raiser's motion to remand on September 15,
2003, BYU was plunged back into Mr. Raiser's motion maelstrom. See R. at 93.
Back in state court, Mr. Raiser picked up right where he had left off. On February
27, 2004, Mr. Raiser filed an "Amended Motion for Second Amended Complaint." R. at
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108. Mr. Raiser attached to that motion yet another proposed amended complaint, this
time seeking to raise claims of false light, false imprisonment, defamation, "publicity of
private life," denial of equal protection as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, violations
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-303 and 63-2-202(2), invasion of privacy, and conspiracy. R.
at 96-100. The district court declined to rule on Mr. Raiser's latest motion to amend on
the ground that Mr. Raiser had not mailed his motion to the correct address for counsel
for BYU. R. 113. The district court instructed Mr. Raiser to mail his motion to the
correct address, at which point Mr. Raiser could submit a new notice to submit and the
court would decide Mr. Raiser's motion. Id
Inexplicably, Mr. Raiser did not mail his motion to the correct address of BYU's
counsel. Rather, he filed a new notice to submit on May 3, 2004. R. at 114. In response,
the district court reminded Mr. Raiser of its previous instruction. R. at 116. Mr. Raiser
responded by filing a motion to reconsider the district court's order. R. at 120. Despite
Mr. Raiser's apparent inability or unwillingness to comply with the district court's
instructions, BYU filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. Raiser's most recent motion
to amend his complaint. R. at 126. The district court initially granted Mr. Raiser's
motion on the ground that BYU had not timely filed a response and was not prejudiced by
amendment. R. at 172. Later, however, upon learning that BYU had timely responded to
Mr. Raiser's motion, the district court vacated that ruling and denied Mr. Raiser's motion.
R. at 193-95 (a true and correct copy of which is enclosed as Addendum A).

-5-

Some time prior to the district court's reconsideration, Mr. Raiser had turned his
attention to obtaining sanctions against BYU pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
11. Specifically, Mr. Raiser had sought sanctions against BYU on the ground that BYU's
attempted removal of the case caused unnecessary and prejudicial delay. R. at 173. The
district court denied that motion. R. at 172-73. In a subsequent order, the district court
awarded BYU its reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending itself against Mr.
Raiser's Rule 11 motion. R. at 192 (a true and correct copy of which is attached as
Addendum A). After Mr. Raiser unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the district
court's award of attorney fees, the district court further awarded BYU the attorney fees it
had incurred in responding to Mr. Raiser's motion for reconsideration. See R. at 226 (a
true and correct copy of which is attached as Addendum B). The district court entered
judgment in favor of BYU against Mr. Raiser in the amount of $2,791.75, with interest
accruing at the rate of 4,77% per annum. R. at 238.2
Having obtained a judgment against Mr. Raiser, BYU requested an order requiring
Mr. Raiser to testify, "under oath, concerning his property, and to restrain [Mr. Raiser]
from disposing of, transferring, selling or conveying any of his non-exempt property
which he owns or controls pending the hearing." R. at 258. Although BYU's motion

2

Mr. Raiser unsuccessfully attempted to appeal the judgment against him. See
Raiser v. Brigham Young Univ., 2005 UT App 412 (unpublished disposition). R. at 372.
In connection with that appeal, he executed an affidavit and application for waiver of
court fees. R. at 274. In that affidavit, Mr. Raiser noted income, property, cash reserves,
and amounts receivable. R. at 271, 273. That appeal was ultimately dismissed.
-6-

erroneously cited to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69 as support for the motion, it clearly
referenced the judgment sought to be collected and even attached a copy of the judgment.
R. at 254, 257. The district court granted BYU's motion and scheduled a supplemental
hearing for July 19, 2005—a date falling almost two months from the date of the order,
and upon which Mr. Raiser had previously told counsel that he would be in Utah to attend
depositions related to other actions he had commenced. R. at 256 (a true and correct copy
of which is attached as Addendum C).3 The district court's order was personally served
upon Mr. Raiser. R. at 275.
Mr. Raiser objected to the district court's order requiring him to appear in Utah on
July 19, 2005 on the ground that BYU had improperly relied on a rule that was no longer
in force. R. at 283. Despite that objection, the district court held the hearing, and Mr.
Raiser failed to appear. R. at 293. Upon request of counsel for BYU, the district court
issued on July 19, 2006, a bench warrant for Mr. Raiser, with cash bail set at $500.00. Id
In response to the bench warrant, Mr. Raiser filed a "Motion of bias" (dated July

3

Attached as Addendum D are e-mails received by BYU's counsel from Mr.
Raiser (the "Communications"). Those Communications demonstrate that BYU
attempted to schedule the supplemental hearing for a time that Mr. Raiser was already
scheduled to be in Utah, and that July 19, 2005, was satisfactory to Mr. Raiser. These
Communications are not part of the record in this case, but they are a part of the federal
district court record for one of the cases for which Mr. Raiser was slated to attend a
deposition in Utah. See Case No. 2:04cv896, Raiser v. The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints et aL Doc. No. 90, Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def. Brigham Young
University's Mot. for Protective Order filed Jul. 12, 2005 at exhs. A, D, & F. BYU
respectfully requests this Court to take judicial notice of these Communications. See
Utah R.Evid. 201.
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10, 2005) with the district court, claiming, in essence, that the district court's numerous
adverse rulings demonstrated that the district court judge was biased and should be
disqualified.4 R. at 294. On the same day that he filed his "Motion of bias," Mr. Raiser
filed a "Second Motion for Sanctions Rule 11" (dated July 13, 2006), which claimed
entitlement to sanctions on the ground that the supplemental order and bench warrant
violated Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(d) and other principles. R. at 296. On
August 9, 2005, Mr. Raiser filed yet another motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11. R.
at 312.
On August 30, 2005, BYU sought judgment on the pleadings. R. at 322. Mr.
Raiser responded with, among other things, yet another motion for leave to amend his
complaint, filed on September 21, 2005. R. at 351. That new proposed complaint sought
to plead claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, false light, false imprisonment,
and violations of equal protection as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. R. at 339-42.
The district court initially declined to rule on Mr. Raiser's motions to disqualify on
the ground that they were filed subsequent to Mr. Raiser's notice of appeal, thereby
divesting the district court of jurisdiction over those motions. R. at 368-69. When
jurisdiction returned to the district court, however, the court denied Mr. Raiser's motions
to disqualify. R. at 381 (a true and correct copy of which is attached as Addendum E).
Mr. Raiser's motions for Rule 11 sanctions, however, remained, with the addition

4

Mr. Raiser amended this motion on August 22, 2005. R. at 319.
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of a "Motion to submit an Amended Second Motion for Sanctions Rule 11," which was
filed on December 15, 2005, and denied by the court on January 13, 2006. R. at 393, 421
(a true and correct copy of which is attached as Addendum F). Mr. Raiser followed that
up with a "second rule 11 sanction motion" on February 13, 2006. In a hearing held on
February 24, 2006—which Mr. Raiser did not attend—the district court denied Mr.
Raiser's remaining motions for sanctions and his motion to amend his complaint, and it
granted BYU's motion for judgment on the pleadings. R. at 429, 481 (a true and correct
copy of which is attached as Addendum G). Mr. Raiser filed a notice of appeal on May 1,
2006. R. at 431. On June 5, 2006, the district court entered an amended judgment against
Mr. Raiser and in favor of BYU in the amount of $4,748.15, with interest accruing at
6.36% per annum, to reflect the additional attorney fees BYU incurred in defending itself
against Mr. Raiser's multitudinous motions for Rule 11 sanctions. R. at 489 (a true and
correct copy of which is attached as Addendum H).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
BYU did not violate Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11 by attempting to remove this
case to federal court, even though that attempt was ultimately unsuccessful. And the
district court properly awarded BYU the attorney fees and costs it incurred in defending
itself against Mr. Raiser's numerous Rule 11 motions.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 64 provides an indisputable basis for conducting the
supplemental proceeding designed to ascertain Mr. Raiser's assets. Moreover, the notice
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of hearing was personally served upon Mr. Raiser, scheduled the hearing to allow Mr.
Raiser plenty of time to arrange to come to Utah, and clearly referenced the judgment
sought to be enforced. BYU did not violate Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(d) by
failing to disclose any material facts; indeed, BYU did disclose all material facts. And
neither the supplemental proceeding nor the bench warrant violated Mr. Raiser's
constitutional rights; the district court's contempt power authorized it to issue the bench
warrant for failing to attend the properly noticed supplemental proceeding. Finally, Mr.
Raiser's motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis did not preclude issuance of the
bench warrant.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying either Mr. Raiser's third
or fourth attempts to amend his complaint. Neither of those attempts set forth any
articulable basis for allowing amendment. Although the merits of the claims Mr. Raiser
sought to raise in his fourth attempt to amend his complaint are irrelevant, those claims
were meritless. Specifically, a one-year statute of limitations applies to Mr. Raiser's false
light claim regardless of whether the newspaper and internet articles are incorporated into
that cause of action.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to disqualify
Judge Howard. Mr. Raiser articulated no basis for disqualification except the court's
adverse rulings, and adverse rulings are not a valid basis for disqualification.

-10-

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
DENYING MR. RAISER'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND AWARDING
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS TO BYU.
A,

BYU Did Not Violate Rule 11 by Seeking to Remove its State Court
Case to Federal Court.

Although even the gist of Mr. Raiser's argument in this regard is far from clear, he
appears to insinuate that BYU violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11 by improperly
relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) in seeking to remove Mr. Raiser's state court case to
federal court, and that this allegedly improper reliance somehow makes the award of
attorneys' fees and costs against him improper. See Opening Br. of Appellant at 13-14.
If that is indeed Mr. Raiser's argument, it fails on a number of levels. At the outset,
contrary to Mr. Raiser's contention, BYU did not so much as allude to § 1441(a). See id.
at 13. Instead, BYU relied on § 1441(c) and its related commentary to demonstrate that
one purpose of § 1441(c) is to "avoid piecemeal litigation by permitting the federal court
to address and dispose of, on the merits, all of the claims asserted, at least when the others
had some kind of logical relationship to the claim that acted as the federal touchstone."
See R. at 52-53 (internal quotation marks omitted). BYU further identified the fact that
Mr. Raiser's allegations in the state case were "copied almost verbatim into his complaint
in the Federal case." Id at 53. In sum, BYU argued that due to the "logical relationship"
between the state and federal cases— both arising out of nearly identical alleged
facts—removal was appropriate to avoid piecemeal litigation. See kL Section 1441(a)
-11-

never came into play.
Mr. Raiser further contends, without citation to any pertinent legal authority, that
BYU's reliance upon 28 U.S.C. §1367 was likewise sanctionable because "§ 1367 is
available only to a plaintiff filing in federal court and not a defendant in state court." See
Opening Br. of Appellant at 14. Contrary to Mr. Raiser's unsupported assertion, it is well
settled that § 1367 "applies with equal force to cases removed to federal court as to cases
initially filed there; a removed case is necessarily one of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction." City of Chi, v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons. 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In short, BYU's basis for attempted removal and consolidation was sound.
The fact that BYU's motion was denied in no way provides a basis for sanctions, Rule
11-based or otherwise.5 The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that "Rule 11 does not
impose a duty to do perfect or exhaustive research" or even that "the attorney . . . reach
the correct legal position from the research. It is enough that the attorney's reading of the
law is a reasonable one." Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1992).
Accordingly, "once an attorney forms a reasonable opinion after conducting appropriate
research, the mere fact that the attorney's view of the law was wrong cannot support a
finding of a rule 11 violation." Id.

5

Because Mr. Raiser cited no legal basis for sanctions, the district court's only
viable option was to "treat the motion as a Rule 11 motion for sanctions." R. at 193 (a
true and correct copy of which is attached as Addendum A).
-12-

Clearly, BYU conducted appropriate research and formed a reasonable opinion
based on that research. The ultimate denial of its motion to remove does not undermine
the appropriateness and reasonableness of BYU's research and opinions. BYU's
attempted removal and consolidation does not even approach the threshold required for
Rule 11 sanctions.
B.

The District Court Properly Awarded BYU its Attorney Fees
and Costs Incurred in Defending Against Mr. Raiser's Motion
for Sanctions.

In a nutshell, Mr. Raiser argues that because he should have won his motion for
Rule 11 sanctions against BYU, he should not have been sanctioned himself. See
Opening Br. of Appellant at 14. Again, Mr. Raiser's argument is imprecise. The district
court did not "sanction" Mr. Raiser. Rather, in the district court's own words, it awarded
BYU "reasonable attorney's fees and expenses for the costs of defending against [Mr.
Raiser's] motion for sanctions." See R. at 192 (emphasis added) (a true and correct copy
of which is attached as Addendum A). In other words, the district court simply held that
BYU was entitled to reimbursement of the attorney fees and costs it incurred in defending
against Mr. Raiser's Rule 11 motion for sanctions.
Diction aside, the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs to BYU was
entirely proper and justified. In pertinent part, Rule 11 provides that "the court may
award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees
incurred in presenting or opposing the motion" for Rule 11 sanctions. See Utah R. Civ. P.
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11(c)(1)(A). This Court has confirmed a district court's ability to award attorney fees to
the prevailing party pursuant to Rule 11: "[U]nder the plain language of rule 11, a court
may award attorney fees to the prevailing party." K.F.K. v. T.W., 2005 UT App 85, ^ 3,
110 P.3d 162. Furthermore, "[t]here is no subsidiary finding of violation of rule 11
required to award attorney fees incurred in opposing a rule 11 motion. Quite the contrary,
the basis for the award is that rule 11 was not violated." Id (internal citation omitted).
Perhaps Mr. Raiser's confusion arises from the district court's statements that his
Rule 11 motion was "frivolous since it [was] unsupported by any legal authority,"6 that it
"merely delayed the proceedings," and that it "was an attempt to harass [BYU] and
increase the cost of litigation." See R. at 192 (a true and correct copy of which is attached
as Addendum A). Although all those statements are true and would support a Rule 11
motion for sanctions (in addition to the attorney fee award BYU had already received)
had BYU filed one, the fact remains that the district court did not sanction Mr. Raiser and
no sanctions were necessary for the court to properly award BYU its attorney fees and
costs expended to defeat Mr. Raiser's Rule 11 motion. Hence, the district court's award
to BYU was proper. See K.F.K.. 2005 UT App 85, ^ 3.

6

Mr. Raiser contends that he "did cite to authority"—28 U.S.C. § 1441—in his
motion for sanctions. See Opening Br. of Appellant at 15. Although Mr. Raiser did
"cite" to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the district court concluded that Mr. Raiser's motion was
"unsupported by any legal authority." See R. at 192 (a true and correct copy of which is
attached as Addendum A). Indeed, Mr. Raiser's citation to § 1441—which merely
discusses removal generally—does not support an award of sanctions against ESYU.
-14-

II.

BYU PROPERLY OBTAINED, AND THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY
ISSUED, A BENCH WARRANT AGAINST MR. RAISER FOR FAILURE
TO APPEAR AT A SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDING.
A.

Rule 64 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Provides a Basis for
Conducting the Supplemental Proceeding.

Mr. Raiser argues that the bench warrant was improperly issued because B YU, in
its motion and order for supplemental proceedings, referenced Rule 69 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure rather than Rule 64. See Opening Br. of Appellant at 16. BYU's
motion did contain a typographical error referring to Rule 69 rather than Rule 64. See R.
at 281. But Rule 64 unambiguously empowers district courts to "conduct hearings as
necessary to identify property and to apply the property toward the satisfaction of the
judgment or order." See Utah R. Civ. P. 64(c)(2). The district court was clearly
authorized to conduct the supplemental proceeding.
Moreover, BYU's motion otherwise accurately referenced the judgment entered
against Mr. Raiser, and it even contained a copy of that judgment as an attachment. See
R. at 276-81. And it described, in detail, the nature of the hearing at which Mr. Raiser
failed to appear. See R. at 279. Additionally, as a courtesy to Mr. Raiser, the order
provided nearly two months' advanced notice so that Mr. Raiser could make
arrangements to be at the hearing. See id. Thus, not only was the district court
authorized to conduct the supplemental proceeding, BYU's typographical error did not
prejudice Mr. Raiser in any way. Indeed, Mr. Raiser's notice and opportunity to prepare
for and attend the hearing was imminently fair.
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B.

Issuance of the Bench Warrant Does Not Implicate, Let Alone
Violate, Rule 3.3 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Mr. Raiser further argues that BYU somehow violated Utah Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.3 when it failed to disclose to the district court the "material fact" that Mr.
Raiser was "homeless in California, and did not have the financial means to travel to Utah
for the hearing." See Opening Br. of Appellant at 16. Mr. Raiser's contention is
evidently that his alleged poverty, and his consequent inability to travel to Utah, virtually
ensured that a bench warrant would be issued. Mr. Raiser's argument is fatally flawed.
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 provides that "[i]n an ex parte proceeding,
a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will
enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse."
See Utah R. Prof Conduct 3.3(d). At the outset, it is highly doubtful that a court
proceeding for which Mr. Raiser received notice via personal service, but which Mr.
Raiser simply failed to attend, can be classified as "ex parte." See R. at 275. At any rate,
BYU did not fail to disclose any material fact to the court during the proceeding.
Specifically, Mr. Raiser's alleged poverty is not a material fact. Mr. Raiser's supposed
inability to come to Utah to prosecute his claims has no bearing whatsoever on the claims
themselves. Indeed, Mr. Raiser uses his alleged poverty as a shield to protect himself
from the responsibilities of being a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit even as he attempts to reap
the benefits of the justice system. This he cannot do. To put it more colloquially, if Mr.
Raiser wishes to play ball, he must come to the park.
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Moreover, although Mr. Raiser may have made claims of homelessness during the
course of the litigation, the purpose of the supplemental proceeding was for BYU to
specifically question Mr. Raiser about the nature of his financial condition under oath.
And, in any event, BYU believed that Mr. Raiser was employed full-time and was
receiving funds from family sources. See R. at 301.
Perhaps more significantly, Mr. Raiser has consistently attempted to mislead the
courts regarding his ability to attend the supplemental proceedings. Specifically, in his
"Second Motion for Sanctions Rule 11," which he dated July 13, 2005, Mr. Raiser
disingenuously alleged that BYU "sought to have Plaintiff arrested when he did not
show" for the supplemental proceeding. R. at 296. Mr. Raiser so alleged despite the fact
that the hearing had not yet even taken place. Similarly misleading is Mr. Raiser's
statement, in his opening brief before this Court, that "[i]f informing a trial judge that a
party does not have the means to get to the hearing— guaranteeing the arrest warrant—is
not material then what is?" See Opening Br. of Appellant at 17. Not only did Mr. Raiser
not inform BYU that he did not have the means to come to the supplemental proceeding,
but he had previously promised that he would be in Utah on the day set for the
supplemental proceeding for his deposition in a separate lawsuit that he had filed against
BYU. See Communications, attached hereto as Addendum D. In sum, BYU had no
obligation under Rule 3.3(d) as it applied to the supplemental proceeding and, even if it
did, it did not fail to disclose any material fact.
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C.

The Supplemental Proceeding and the Issuance of the Bench
Warrant Did Not Violate Mr. Raiser's Constitutional Rights.

Mr. Raiser "questions the legality of allowing a person to be arrested for not
attending a supplemental hearing." See Opening Br. of Appellant at 17. Specifically, Mr.
Raiser argues that "to arrest someone solely on account of their status of being too poor to
comply with a court Order . .. would appear to offend our sense of due process of law."
See id at 18. That argument fails.
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that
the mere failure to pay a debt or meet an obligation is not punishable by
imprisonment. However, when a proper order or judgment has been made, one
who stands in wilful defiance or disobedience thereof may be found in
contempt of court and punished by imprisonment. This is a necessary power
of the court in order to enforce its orders and judgments.
Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted). Quite simply, the district court did not issue a bench warrant for Mr. Raiser
"because he did not pay a debt," or because he was "too poor to comply with a court
[ojrder." Instead, Mr. Raiser was ordered to appear at a supplemental proceeding. R. at
279. He was personally served with notice of that proceeding. R. at 275. Despite that
order and notice, Mr. Raiser failed to comply with the court order. Although the district
court did not explicitly say that it issued the resulting bench warrant in exercise of its
contempt power, it was clearly authorized to do so. See Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68,
f 36, 123 P.3d 416 (noting that a court's power to hold a litigant in contempt derives from
both statutory and inherent authority); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1(5) (noting that
-18-

violation of court order is grounds for contempt); Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-10 (discussing
sanctions available for contempt); Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-14 (discussing arrest for
nonappearance when appearance was required). Thus, the district court did not violate
Mr. Raiser's constitutional rights by issuing the bench warrant.
D.

Mr, Raiser's Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis Did Not
Preclude the District Court from Issuing the Bench Warrant

Mr. Raiser argues that his application to proceed in forma pauperis precluded the
district court's issuance of the bench warrant. That argument is not grounded in fact. Mr.
Raiser's application was filed on June 6, 2005, after the court issued its May 23, 2005,
order to appear at the supplemental proceedings. R. at 274, 279. And, on its face, Mr.
Raiser's application to proceed in forma pauperis discloses, however small, income, cash,
and amounts receivable—all of which Mr. Raiser could have used to appear at the
supplemental proceeding and all of which could potentially serve as a basis from which
BYU could recover its judgment amount. ISee R. at 271-73. Thus, even if a
subsequently-filed application to proceed in forma pauperis could, in general, preclude a
district court from issuing a bench warrant based on a failure to appear at a supplemental
proceeding, Mr. Raiser's application did not reveal that he was so poor that appearance at
the supplemental proceeding was impossible. That application did not preclude the
district court from issuing the bench warrant.
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E.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Awarding to BYU
Additional Attorney Fees and Costs Related to Mr. Raiser's Additional
Motions for Sanctions.

Finally, Mr. Raiser challenges the district court's award to BYU of additional
attorney fees and costs related to the additional motions for sanctions Mr. Raiser filed.
Again, contrary to Mr. Raiser's assertions, the district court did not sanction Mr. Raiser
"an additional $1,822.50." See Opening Br. of Appellant at 20. Instead, because Mr.
Raiser continued to file motions for sanctions—and continued to lose those motions—the
district court awarded BYU its reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending those
motions. See R. at 481 (a true and correct copy of which is attached as Addendum G).
As set forth above, a district court has discretion to award attorney fees to the prevailing
party in a Rule 11 motion for sanctions. That award was not an abuse of discretion, and
the district court properly awarded BYU an additional $1,882.50.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
DENYING MR. RAISER'S MOTIONS TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT
Although it is far from clear, under the heading of "One Year Delay Caused by

Defendant's Improper Removal Should Not Be Counted Against Appellant When
Amending Complaint," Mr. Raiser apparently asserts that the district court improperly
denied his Motion to Amend Second Amended Complaint. See Opening Br. of Appellant
at 20-21. However, Mr. Raiser's argument is barren of any applicable legal analysis or
citation. In denying Mr. Raiser's motion, the district court ruled as follows:
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The Court notes that Plaintiffs present motion to amend is his third
motion to amend in two years. Plaintiff fails to give any explanation why a
third amended complaint is necessary this late in the litigation process.
Plaintiff merely requests the motion to amend be granted "in the interest of
justice." The Court finds that Plaintiffs failure to give any justification for his
delay in requesting a third motion to amend this late in the litigation process
bars another attempt to amend his complaint
Morever, it appears from the
record that Plaintiff had prior knowledge of the events giving rise to many of
the new claims in his proposed amemded [sic] complaint as those claims are
based on the same factual allegations that were set forth in the original
complaint.
R. at 193-94 (a true and correct copy of which is attached as Addendum A). Tellingly,
Mr. Raiser has similarly failed to provide any viable explanation on appeal for why a third
amended complaint was necessary or why the claims were not originally alleged when he
had prior knowledge of the events underlying the "new" allegations. This Court should
reject Mr. Raiser's arguments on that basis.
Mr. Raiser further misleadingly claims that he filed a "motion to submit for
decision on March 16, 2004" and, accordingly, "BYU should have been barred from
submitting their [sic] opposition 2 months later on May 26, 2004." See Opening Br. of
Appellant at 21. But it is quite clear from the record that, after receiving Mr. Raiser's
notice to submit for decision, the district court instructed Mr. Raiser on April 19, 2004, to
mail his motion to amend to BYU's correct mailing address. See R. at 113. Instead of
certifying service of his motion to amend to BYU's correct address, Mr. Raiser simply
filed another motion to submit for decision on May 3, 2005. See R. at 114. The district
court identified this failure to comply in its May 5, 2004, Ruling Re: Second Motion to

-21-

Submit for Decision, stating that "the Court declines to rule on the Motion to Submit for
Decision until Plaintiff has complied with the Court's previous ruling." R. at 116.
Instead of simply sending his motion and certifying service of it to BYU, Mr. Raiser filed
a Motion to Reconsider on May 17, 2004, seeking to have the district court chcinge its
ruling on the motions to submit. R. at 120. Nevertheless, despite never having been
officially served with a copy of Mr. Raiser's motion, BYU filed a timely memorandum in
opposition to Mr. Raiser's motion on May 26, 2004. R. at 126. Thus, contrary to Mr.
Raiser's contentions, BYU's opposition was timely and, indeed, charitable to Mr. Raiser's
refusal to comply with the district court's orders.
Although it is again far from clear, Mr. Raiser also appears to argue that the
amendments he sought to make to his complaint, via his September 21, 2005, motion to
amend, would have stated valid causes of action, and that he should have been granted
leave to amend his complaint on that basis. See Opening Br. of Appellant at 21-22. It is
unclear from Mr. Raiser's argument whether the allegedly valid claims he sought to
introduce were tied to his third or his fourth attempts to amend his complaint. In
responding to Mr. Raiser's contentions, BYU will assume that Mr. Raiser challenges the
district court's denial of his September 21, 2005, motion to amend his complaint. A fair
reading of Mr. Raiser's brief justifies that assumption, and this Court is not a "depository
in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." See Mi
Vida Enters, v. Steen-Adams, 2005 UT App 400, f 15 n.4, 122 P.3d 144; see also United
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States v. Dunkel 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that "judges are not like pigs,
hunting for truffles buried in briefs").
Although the claims Mr. Raiser sought to assert in his September 21, 2005,
proposed amended complaint were meritless, the validity of those claims is neither here
nor there. The decision to deny Mr. Raiser's September 21, 2005, motion to amend his
complaint rested within the sound discretion of the district court. See Neztsosie v. Meyer,
883 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 1994) ("We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion to
amend a complaint absent a clear abuse of discretion."). As with his prior attempt to
amend his complaint, Mr. Raiser's September 21, 2005, motion did not allege any facts
that were not available to him when he filed his initial complaint over three years earlier.
Before this Court, Mr. Raiser presents dubious reasons for his delay and summarily states:
"Thus some leeway should be allowed to Appellant, he believes, in allowance to further
amend the complaint under URCP 15 given the procedural background of this case."
Opening Br. of Appellant at 22. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing
to allow Mr. Raiser to amend his complaint three years into the litigation when he
presented nothing that would otherwise justify amendment.
Although Mr. Raiser's challenge is clearly to the district court's denial of his
motion to amend, he does appear to stealthily challenge the district court's dismissal of
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his false light claim.7 Specifically, he argues that "[t]he newspaper article and internet
article [that formed the basis of his defamation claim] are also included in the false light
claim" and that the claim is therefore subject to a four-year rather than a one-year statute
of limitations. See id. at 24. But the Utah Supreme Court has made clear that a "one-year
limit [applies to] to false light invasion claims that flow from allegedly defamatory
statements." Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, f 53; 130 P.3d 325. The "newspaper
article" and the "internet article" formed the basis of Mr. Raiser's defamation claim. See
R. at 43-46. Therefore, even if those articles are somehow integrated into Mr Raiser's
false light claim, that claim remains barred by the one-year statute of limitations.8
Finally, Mr. Raiser's admittedly "new" claim for unreasonable search or seizure
was never asserted as a basis for amending his complaint or as a basis for recovery.
Therefore, Mr. Raiser cannot raise that argument in any context before this Court.

See

438 Main Street v. Easy Heat Inc., 2004 UT 72, If 51, 99 P.3d 801.
In fine, Mr. Raiser mounts no valid challenge against the district court's denial of
his motions to amend his complaint, or, for that matter, the district court's dismissal of

7

Mr. Raiser does not challenge any other aspect of the district court's dismissal of
his Second Amended Complaint—the last complaint recognized and permitted by the
district court. That complaint contained four causes of action: false light, false
imprisonment, defamation, and publicity of private life. R. at 33-36.
8

Mr. Raiser alleges that the newspaper article was published August 29, 2000, and
that the internet article was published during early 1999. R. at 44, 45. Mr. Raiser
commenced this action on August 26, 2002. R. at 12. That is clearly outside of the
applicable statute of limitations.
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Mr. Raiser's case on the pleadings. Rather, he inexplicably expends a good deal of effort
and paper arguing, without legal citation, the supposed merits of the claims he wished to
bring. This Court should affirm the district court's discretionary decision to deny Mr.
Raiser the opportunity to amend his complaint a third and fourth time. And, insofar as
Mr. Raiser argues otherwise, the Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of Mr.
Raiser's case.
IV.

EVEN IF REMAND WERE APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE, NO BASIS
EXISTS FOR REMANDING TO ANOTHER JUDGE
Although no basis whatsoever exists for remanding this case, if the case were to be

remanded, no basis exists for assigning a new judge to the case. It is well settled that "no
deduction of bias and prejudice may be made from adverse rulings by a judge." In re
Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1997). Mr. Raiser does not challenge the
denial of his "motions of bias"; instead, he summarily rehashes adverse decisions made
against him in the district court to support the proposition that "a new judge would appear
proper." See Opening Br. of Appellant at 26. The fact that Mr. Raiser was regularly
unsuccessful in his voluminous and repetitious motion practice in this case has no bearing
on a determination of judicial bias. Hence, Judge Howard need not be recused from this
case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant/Appellee B YU respectfully requests that this
Court affirm the district court's rulings as set forth herein.
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DATED this $& day of January, 2007.
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE

David M. Kono
Attorneys for Brigham Young University
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this j&

day of January 2007,1 caused to be mailed, first

class, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY to each of the following:
Aaron Raiser
General Delivery
Canoga Park, California 91303
Erik G. Davis
Office of the General Counsel
Brigham Young University, ASB #A-350
Provo, Utah 84602

David M. Kono
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AARON RAISER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY,

RULING RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OR RELIEF FROM RULING.
Case # 020403619
Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendant.

Division 5

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration OR
Relief From Ruling. The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises,
hereby issues the following:
RULING
The Court issued a Ruling on August 25, 2004 granting Plaintiffs Motion to Amend
Second Amended Complaint. The Ruling was based on the Court's mistaken belief that
Defendant failed to timely respond. However, Defendant timely responded to Plaintiffs motion
on May 26, 2004. On September 1, 2004, Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration or
Relief from Ruling pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), urging the Court to reissue its ruling
based on the entire record. In light of Defendant's timely response to Plaintiffs motion, the
Court vacates its prior ruling.
On February 27, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend his Second Amended
Complaint, contending that an additional amendment should be granted "in the interest of
justice." Plaintiff also filed a separate Motion for Sanctions, contending that Defendant
deliberately designed to delay the progress of litigation. However, Plaintiff failed to cite any
statute or rule to support his motion for sanctions. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs motion to
amend should not be granted as a matter of course since this is his third attempt to amend the

complaint, he also failed to state any grounds for this motion to amend, and he gave no
justification for the nearly two year delay. Defendant also asserts that Plaintiffs motion for
sanctions should be treated as a Rule 11 motion since that is the only basis to support the motion,
and that Plaintiff failed to comply with the procedural prerequisites of Rule 11. Defendant
additionally requests attorney fees and expenses pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(A).
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to "amend his pleading
once as a matter of course," but any other attempt at amending the complaint will be granted
"only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party." In addition, a motion to
amend must "state with particularity the grounds therefor." Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339,
1f 43, 79 P.3d 974 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)). The court will also deny a motion to amend
when it is untimely and the party gives no justification for the delay or it is a result of bad faith.
Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44,ffif's26, 38, 87 P.3d 734. A motion to
amend is untimely when it is "filed several years into the litigation" and the extended delay
prevents the non-moving party from "effectively responding] to the new allegations or claims"
because either the witnesses have moved or died, or they no longer remember the details of the
event, or documents may have been lost or destroyed. Id. at 130.
The Court notes that Plaintiffs present motion to amend is his third motion to amend
in two years. Plaintiff fails to give any explanation why a third amended complaint is necessary
this late in the litigation process. Plaintiff merely requests the motion to amend be granted "in the
interest of justice." The Court finds that Plaintiffs failure to give any justification for his delay
in requesting a third motion to amend this late in the litigation process bars another attempt to
amend his complaint. The record shows that the alleged incident that led to the filing of the
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complaint occurred five years ago, and the passage of time makes it increasingly difficult for
Defendant to effectively respond to the new allegations since many of the witnesses may be
students who have moved on to other parts of the country. Moreover, it appears from the record
that Plaintiff had prior knowledge of the events giving rise to many of the new claims in his
proposed amemded complaint as those claims are based on the same factual allegations that were
set forth in the original complaint. For these reasons, the Court respectfully denies Plaintiffs
Motion to Amend his Second Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff also seeks sanctions against Defendant on the grounds that Defendant's
motion to consolidate and the removal of this case to federal court delayed the progress of the
litigation. Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that the motion was filed with an improper motive and
without basis in the law because the federal court denied it. Although Plaintiff provides no
statutory basis for requesting sanctions against Defendant, the Court will treat the motion as a
Rule 11 motion for sanctions.
The Utah Supreme Court has held "[o]nce an attorney forms a reasonable opinion after
conducting appropriate research, the mere fact that the attorney's view of the law was wrong
cannot support a finding of a Utah R. Civ. P. 11 violation." Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229,
1236 (Utah 1992). By declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the federal court did not
indicate that Defendant had any improper motive when it sought to remove and consolidate the
cases. The Supreme Court held that "Utah R. Civ. P. 11 does not impose a duty to do perfect
exhaustive research. The appropriate standard is whether the research was objectively reasonable
under all the circumstances." Id. "Nor does rule 11 require the attorney to reach the correct legal
position from the research. It is enough that the attorney's reading of the law is a reasonable
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one." Id. The Courtfindsthat Defendant's decision to remove this case to federal court was not
done with an improper motive or was without a basis in law. Though the federal court reached a
different conclusion than Defendant or declined to assert its supplemental jurisdiction does
support a conclusion that Defendant violated Rule 11. Therefore, the Court respectfully denies
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions.
In response to Plaintiffs motion for sanctions, Defendant contends it should be
awarded attorney fees and expenses pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(A) for the costs of defending
against Plaintiffs motion for sanctions. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs motion was made in
bad faith and it failed to comply with the procedures of Rule 11. The Courtfindsthat Plaintiff
failed to comply with Rule 11 in seeking sanction against Defendant. Plaintiff failed to notify
and serve Defendant with the motion for sanctions as Rule 11(c)(1)(A) requires. Moreover, the
Courtfindsthat Plaintiffs motion is frivolous since it is unsupported by any legal authority.
Plaintiffs motion merely delayed the proceedings and was an attempt to harass Defendant and
increase the cost of litigation. The Court, therefore, grants Defendant's motion for sanctions
pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and awards Defendant reasonable attorney's fees and expenses for
the costs of defending against Plaintiffs motion for sanctions. Counsel for Defendant is
instructed to prepare an order consistent with this Ruling.
Dated this ^ 6

day of October, 2004.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the ^ °
October, 2004 to the following in the manner indicated, to wit:

By U.S. first class mail
Plaintiff:
Aaron Raiser, Pro Se
General Delivery
Castaic, CA 91310

Attorney for Defendant:
Erik G. Davis
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
Brigham Young University
A-350 ASB
Provo, UT 84602

Deputy Court Clerk
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AARON RAISER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.

RULING RE: PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER OR
VACATE 10/26/2004 RULING/
ORDER
Case #020403619
Judge Fred D. Howard
Division 5

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider or Vacate
10/26/2004 Ruling/Order. The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the
premises, hereby issues the following:
RULING
The Court notes that Defendant requests a hearing on the matter. The Court, however,
is well aware of the issues and facts regarding this motion and considers a hearing unnecessary
since the issues and facts are straightfoward.
The Court issued a Ruling on October 26, 2004, vacating a prior ruling which was
based on the Court's mistaken belief that Defendant failed to timely respond to Plaintiffs
motion. In the October Ruling, the Court denied Plaintiffs motion to amend his Second
Amended Complaint and granted Defendant's motion for sanctions. Plaintiff then filed this
Motion to Reconsider on November 3, 2004.
The Court first notes that Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider/Vacate is inappropriate
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the simple reason that no such motion exists. The
Utah Supreme Court has long since held that a motion for reconsideration is improper. Utah
State Employees Credit Union v. Riding, 469 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1970) ("We are unaware of any
such motion under our rules"). The Court has also declared, "a motion to reconsider the final

judgment of the district court [is] a motion which is not provided for under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and which has never been recognized as a proper motion in this state. Wisden v.
Bangerter et al, 893 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Utah 1995). Although Rule 60(b) provides for postjudgment relief in certain circumstances, Plaintiff has not relied upon Rule 60(b) nor does he
claim entitlement to post-judgment relief on the basis of any of the reasons set forth in Rule
60)9b).
The Court notes that Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider fails to raise any new facts not
previously argued in the prior pleadings. Moreover, Plaintiff misconstrues and misrepresents the
procedural history of this case and fails to marshal any case law or other authority in support of
this new motion. Since Plaintiffs motion merely re-argues the previously filed motion, the
Court finds that the present Motion to Reconsider serves no purpose other than to further delay
the proceedings and increase costs associated with this litigation.
The Court, therefore, denies Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and grants Defendant's
request for additional attorney's fees and costs incurred in responding to this motion. The Court
has reviewed Defendant's Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs associated with responding to
this motion and the previous motion and finds those fees to be reasonable. Accordingly, the
Court awards Defendant's Attorney Fees and Costs in the amount of $2,791.75. Counsel for
Defendant is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this Ruling.
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Dated this ^ > W a y of March, 2005.
BY THE COURT:
"7

JUDGE FRED D
Kstrict Court Xtfdge
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the ^ ^

day of

March, 2005 to the following in the manner indicated, to wit:

By U.S. first class mail
Plaintiff:
Aaron Raiser, Pro Se
General Delivery
Castaic, CA 91310
Attorney for Defendant:
Daniel L. Steele
David M. Kono
BENNET, TUELLER, JOHNSON & DEERE
3865 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84109

Deputy Court Clerk
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ORDER
THE STATE OF UTAH TO PLAINTIFF AARON RAISER.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, pursuant to the foregoing Motion, and good cause
appearing, you appear in person before this Court at the time and place shown below to answer
questions, under oath, concerning your property.
Date: July 19,2005

Time: 8:45 a.m.

Place: Fourth District Court
Utah County
125 North 100 West
Provo, Utah 84601
YOU ARE FURTHER ORDERED not to sell, loan, give away, or otherwise dispose of
your non-exempt property pending the hearing.
If you have been personally served with this Order and you fail to appear, the Court may
order a Warrant for your arrest.
DATED this ^ 3

^ IF i^ ^

day of May, 2005.
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aaron raiser [aaron_raiser@yahoo.com]
Friday, May 27,2005 7:59 AM
Willis Orton; Dan Steele
David Kono

RE: Raiser v. LDS Church, BYU
I'll plan on coming for the deposition 7/19 in the afternoon; my schedule does not allow
me to come prior as I have to come from California.
Willis Orton <worton@kmclaw.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

Mr. Raiser,
So you are clear, I am in the process of preparing a Motion for
Discovery Sanctions for your failure to appear for your deposition on
May 23, 2005, as was properly noticed. Even if you now decide to show
up for a deposition here in Utah, I will still seek sanctions against
you, including attorneys fees, for your failure to appear on May 23.
As for Saturdays, I am unavailable.
R. Willis Orton
Kirton & McConkie, P.C.
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Direct Line Telephone: (801) 321-4816
Facsimile: (801) 321-4893
email: worton@kmclaw.com
This email is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. Sections 2510-2521 and is legally privileged.
The information
contained in this email is intended only for use of the individual or
entity named above. If the reader of the message is not the intended
recipient, or the employee or agent responsible to deliver it to the
intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination,
distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited.
If you have received this communication in error, please immediately
notify us by collect telephone call at (801) 328-3600 and destroy the
original message.

Wfroinf

Wilis 0 r t o n [worton@kmclaw.com]

Sent:

Thursday, June 23, 2005 9:58 PM

To:

aaron raiser; Dan Steele; Stephen Geary

Co:

David Kono

Subject: RE: Depositions of Towsey, Bramhall and Davis
Mr. Raiser,
You have never told us you wanted to take your three depositions on July 19th. This is the first we have heard of it. That
day would be reserved for our taking your deposition, as you have previously agreed. See my email sent you just moments
ago.
Willis Orton
Original Message
From: aaron raiser [mailto:aaron_raiser@yahoo.com]
Sent: ThuJun 23 17:24:51 2005
To: Dan Steele; Stephen Geary
Cc: Willis Orton; David Kono
Subject:
RE: Depositions of Towsey, Bramhall and Davis
I have previously told each of you I beleive that I
would be there on 7/19 barring orderfromthe court
otherwise; at that time I plan on getting testimony
from others.

^.
Original Message
from: aaron raiser rmailto:aaron_raiser(*vahoo. com]
Sent: Wednesday, June 29, 2005 5:23 PM
To: Willis Orton
Cc: Dan Steele; David Kono
Subject: RE: Rule 26 Conference
You need an option C. What if I say A and the car breaks down in the desert.
It is conditional on being able to get there.
I have said, and earlier, you agreed for the depo in Provo, thus I have
reserved room 408 in the provo court 4th district for 7/19. I don't see why
we can;t do it there.
Willis Orton <worton@kmclaw.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

Mr. Raiser,
You haven't answered my question: if you think you have then please
repeat it. If that is too difficult, try this:
Please answer the following the following
question: "Will you appear
unconditionally for your oral deposition in this matter on July 19,
2005, in Salt Lake City?" The answer options are:
A.

Yes, I will.

B.

No, I will not.

Please email me back an answer, A. or B., as noted above.
R. Willis Orton
Kirton & McConkie, P.C.
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City ,Utah 84111
Direct Line Telephone: (801) 321-4816
Facsimile: (801) 321-4893
email: worton@kmclaw.com
This email is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. Sections 2510-2521 and is legally privileged.
The information
contained in this email is intended only for use of the individual or
entity named above. If the reader of the message is not the intended
recipient, or the employee or agent responsible to deliver it to the
intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination,
distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited.
If you have received this communication in error, please immediately
notify us by collect telephone call at (801) 328-3600 and destroy the
original message.
Original Message
From: aaron raiser rmailto:aaron_raiser@vahoo.coml
Sent: Wednesday, June 29, 2005 9:45 AM
To: Willis Orton
Subject: Re: Rule 26 Conference
I previously have given an answer.

>

>
Willis Orton <worton@kmclaw.com> wrote:
>
> > Mr. Raiser,
> >

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

>
I have no involvement in the other lawsuit.
>
> But you still have not responded to my two prior
> emails— are you going to unconditionally commit
to your oral
> deposition in Salt Lake on July 19th?
>
>
Why don't you answer the question?
>
>
If you don't answer the question, I will notice
your oral deposition
> (also to be videotaped) for July 19 in Salt Lake.
>
> Willis Orton
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Aaron Raiser,

:
Plaintiff

:

ORDER

vs.

:

Date: November 20,2005

Brigham Young University,

:

Case Number: 020403 619

:

Presiding Judge James R. Taylor

Defendant

This matter comes before the Court upon renewed referral from the Honorable Fred D.
Howard pursuant to Rule 63(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court previously
considered the referral and determined that because the case was on appeal the motion was not
legally sufficient and could not be considered. The Court is now aware that the appeal has been
summarily dismissed by the Utah Court of Appeals. Counsel for the Defendant has filed a
"Renewed Request to Submit for Decision" which was received on October 19, 2005 and
includes, as an attachment, a copy of the Memorandum Decision from the Utah Court of
Appeals. The decision has been published through the Court's website although no official copy
of the decision has been transmitted to this Court. The physical file, however, has been returned.
This Court will therefore assume that jurisdiction has been returned to this Court.
Although a number of motions are pending this Court, as a reviewing court under Rule
63(b), will only address the motion to disqualify Judge Howard. The Plaintiff first filed a motion
to disqualify Judge Howard on July 19, 2005. The Defendant responded on August 1, 2005. The
Page 1 of

3

Defendant filed an amended motion of bias on August 22, 2005. The Court will consider the
latest of the motions as the operative motion.
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires a motion to disqualify a judge to be
accompanied by a certificate of good faith and must be supported by an affidavit stating facts
sufficient to show bias, prejudice or conflict of interest. The motion must be timely filed, filed in
good faith and legally sufficient to result in removal of the presiding judge.
In this case the Petitioner's motion is accompanied by an "affidavit" in which he states, "I
Aaron Raiser do certify under penalty pf perjury that the accompanying motion of bias is brought
in good faith and not for delay or to harass etc." The rule plainly requires that the affidavit
contain facts from which the reviewing court can determine if the allegations in the motion show
bias, prejudice or conflict of interest. The affidavit in this case does nothing but aver that the
Plaintiff is acting in good faith. A review of the "Amended Motion of bias" does not clarify the
matter, even if the signed but unsworn motion is regarded as an affidavit. Because the Plaintiff
does not refer to specific orders or action by type of pleading and date this Court is completely
unable to determine if the motion is timely. Moreover, the substance of the complaints seem to
indicate a dissatisfaction with legal rulings and conclusions rather than the exercise of
unreasonable bias or prejudice.
This Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his motion to
remove Judge Howard was timely, brought in good faith or legally sufficient to show bias or

Page 2 of

3

prejudice. The Motion is, therefore, denied. This matter is referred to Judge Howard for such
further proceedings as may be appropriate in the case.
Dated this 20th jdaroTTCdvember, 2005

<Oll
Judge /ames R. T. _ ^
Fourtn Judicial Dism<

^Sfes^

Copies of this Order mailed to:
Counsel for the Plaintiff:
Aaron Raiser (self represented)
General Deliver
Canoga Park, California 91303
Counsel for the Defendant:
Daniel L. Steele
David M. Kono
3865 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Mailed t h i s p / / day of /jtfk)

2005, postage pre-paid as noted above.
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AARON RAISER,
Plaintiff,

vs.
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.

RULING RE: AMENDED SECOND MOTION
FOR SANCTIONS
Case No: 020403619
Judge: FRED D HOWARD
Date: 01/13/2006

Clerk: miket
Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter has submitted his Amended
Second Motion for Sanctions--Rule 11. Having reviewed the amended
motion and the rule, the Court is unpersuaded to grant the motion.
The Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule
11(c)(1)(A) requirements and, therefore, the request for sanctions
must be denied.

J e FEED D

T

Paqe 1

Tf.ffiW

Case No: 020403619
Date:
Jan 13, 2006
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 020403619 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD

NAME

Mail

AARON RAISER
PLAINTIFF
General Delivery
Canoga Park, CA 913 03
DANIEL L STEELE
ATTORNEY DEF
3865 S WASATCH BLVD STE 3 00
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109

Mail

Dated this T3

day of

Q-a/Hu^y

, 2 0 OC .

Deputy Court Clerk
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TabG

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
6 S.f04

\m

ngpnty

Daniel L. Steele (6336)
David M. Kono (8770)
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE
3865 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone No.: 801-272-5600
Facsimile No.: 801-278-1541
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AARON RAISER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.

ORDER (1) GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; (2)
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER FILED
6/24/2005; (3) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS RULE 11
AND AMENDED MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS RULE 11; AND (4)
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
AMEND COMPLAINT
Civil No.: 020403619
Judge Fred D. Howard

The Court, having reviewed the parties' pleadings and heard oral argument of Defendant
Brigham Young University as the only party appearing at the scheduled February 24,2006
hearing hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:

1.

As to Plaintiff s Motion for Relief from Order Filed 6/24/2005, it is clear that

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 64(c)(2) provides a basis in law for holding a post-judgment
hearing to ascertain the assets of a judgment debtor. Plaintiffs Motion is therefore DENIED.
2.

As to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions Rule 11 and Amended Motion for

Sanctions Rule 11, the Court previously denied Plaintiffs Motions on 1/13/2006 for failure to
comply with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(1)(A). Additionally, Plaintiffs allegations
regarding his economic condition do not implicate Rule 11 sanction. Further, the Court will not
consider settlement discussions under Utah Rule of Evidence 408. Therefore, Plaintiffs Motions
for Rule 11 Sanctions are DENIED and Defendant is awarded its reasonable attorneys' fees
incurred to defend the Motions in the amount of $1,822.50. Accordingly, the JUDGMENT
previously entered against Plaintiff Aaron Raiser in this matter on May 13, 2005, is augmented to
the amount of $4,748.15, representing the previous judgment amount of $2,791.75 with interest
of $133.90 having accrued from May 13,2005, through May 15,2006, at 4.77% per annum, plus
$1,822.50.
3.

Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint is DENIED.

4.

Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED. Therefore,

this matter is dismissed with prejudice.

~£Q1

DATED this £

day of

(yU/i<C

, 2006.

BY THE COURT

Honorable Fr^rD. Howari
Fourth District Court Judg?
' \ 7 COURT -v^Sd
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Daniel L. Steele (6336)
David M. Kono (8770)
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE
3865 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone No.: 801-272-5600
Facsimile No.: 801-278-1541
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AARON RAISER,
Plaintiff,

)

AMENDED JUDGMENT

)

(Against Plain tiff Aaron Raiser)

vs.

)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY,

)

Civil No.: 020403619

)

Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendant.

The Court, pursuant to its Order (1) Granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings; (2) Denying Plaintiffs Motion for RelieffromOrder Filed 6/24/2005; (3) Denying
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions Rule 11 and Amended Motion for Sanctions Rule 11; and (4)
Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND
DECREES that Defendant Brigham Young University is awarded Judgment against Plaintiff
Aaron Raiser in the amount of $4,748.15 accruing interest at the rate of 6.36% per annum until

the Judgment is paid in full, and augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees
expended in collecting the Judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by
affidavit.

